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Abstract 
We design an all-pay auction experiment in which we reveal the gender of the 
opponent. Using this design, we find that women bid higher than men, but only 
when bidding against other women. These findings, interpreted through a 
theoretical model incorporating differences in risk attitude and the value of 
winning, suggest that women have a higher value of winning than men. 
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1. Introduction 
There is robust evidence that women bid more aggressively than men in winner-pay 
common value (Casari et al., 2007; Ham and Kagel, 2006) and first-price auctions (Chen et al., 
2013). Such aggressive bidding by women seems inconsistent with a large body of experimental 
work on tournament entry (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011), 
suggesting that women are less (not more) competitive than men because they tend to choose the 
pay-for-performance over the tournament payment scheme (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; 
Cason et al., 2010; Sutter and Glätzle-Rützler, 2015).1 
The main problem in interpreting and reconciling the findings from the auction literature 
and the tournament entry literature is that a choice to bid in an auction and a choice to enter a 
tournament may depend on the same factors, such as risk preferences, as well as unrelated 
factors, such as familiarity with competitive market interactions. For example, women’s lower 
tolerance to risk (Croson and Gneezy, 2009) could explain why they avoid tournaments 
(Dohmen and Falk, 2011), and it could also explain more aggressive bidding in winner-pay 
auctions (Harrison, 1989). Therefore, it may be tempting to conclude that gender differences in 
bidding behavior and tournament entry are driven by the same factor. However, it is also 
possible that there are other factors unique to each environment that may be driving such 
differences.2 
We contribute to the ongoing debate about gender difference in competitiveness by 
designing an all-pay auction experiment in which we reveal the gender of the opponent. Our 
                                                          
1 This literature uses tournament entry decisions in “real effort” experiments to measure competitiveness. Subjects in 
these experiments have a choice to be rewarded by a tournament payment scheme (e.g., to be the best of four) or a 
pay-for-performance payment scheme (i.e., per unit of output). 
2 Women’s choice to avoid tournaments could be also driven by lower confidence (Kamas and Preston, 2012), 
beliefs and gender stereotypes (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, 2011). Similarly, women may overbid in auctions 
because they are not as familiar with competitive market interactions (Ham and Kagel, 2006) and cannot calculate 
the optimal bidding strategies (Geary, 1996; Casari et al., 2007). 
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experimental treatments mimic the comparative statics predictions of a simple theoretical model, 
allowing us to examine differences in bidding that are due to differences in risk attitude and the 
value of winning. By revealing the gender of the opponent, we can rule out a number of other 
confounds that may be causing gender differences, such as beliefs, mistakes and stereotypes. 
Confirming prior findings from the auction and contest literature, we find that women bid 
higher than men (Ham and Kagel, 2006; Casari et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2013; Mago et al., 2013; 
Price and Sheremeta, 2015; Dechenaux et al., 2015). Importantly, this is only when women bid 
against other women. Therefore, we can rule out that higher bidding by women is due to lack of 
familiarity with competitive market interactions or due to inferior mathematical skills which 
prevent women from figuring out the optimal bidding strategies. Such impediments would 
increase women’s bids not only against women but also against men. Our data, interpreted 
through a theoretical model, suggests that women have a higher value of winning. 
 
2. Theoretical Predictions 
All-pay auctions are often used to model real life contests when the costs of competing 
are unrecoverable (Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye et al., 1996). In a standard two player all-pay 
auction with complete information, player 1 with the higher valuation for winning the auction V1 
submits bid b1 and player 2 with the lower valuation V2 submits bid b2. The player who submits 
the highest bid wins the auction and receives the corresponding prize. However, both players 
have to pay their bids irrespective of who wins the auction (hence the term “all-pay auction”). 
Behavior in the all-pay auction can be characterized by a mixed strategy equilibrium, in 
which both players randomly draw their bids from a certain interval (Hillman and Riley, 1989; 
Baye et al., 1996). Theoretically, such behavior depends on the valuation for winning V, which 
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may not necessarily be reflected by the monetary value of the prize (Sheremeta, 2010, 2013, 
2015), and risk aversion R (Fibich et al., 2006; Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006).3 Our theoretical 
model considers these two factors simultaneously. The details of the theoretical model and the 
proofs of the theoretical predictions can be found in Appendix A. Here we provide only a short 
overview of our main results. For convenience, we use “bid” to refer to the “mean bid” (since the 
equilibrium bid is defined by a mixed strategy). 
Table 1: Theoretical Bids by Gender and Opponent 
 Valuation V, Risk aversion R 
Gender Pairs 
VM > VF 
RM < RF 
VM > VF 
RM > RF 
VM < VF 
RM < RF 
VM < VF 
RM > RF 
MM vs. FF > <=> <=> < 
FM vs. FF <=> < <=> < 
MF vs. MM < <=> < <=> 
FM vs. MM < < = = 
MF vs. FF = = < < 
MF vs. FM <=> > < <=> 
 
Table 1 provides theoretical predictions for our experiment. For convenience, FF 
(female-female), FM (female-male), MF (male-female) and MM (male-male) refer to the mean 
bids by females against females, females against males, males against females and males against 
males, respectively. The predictions are based on the assumption that men and women differ in 
their valuation for winning the auction (VM vs. VF) and risk aversion (RM vs. RF). When valuation 
and risk aversion have the same effect on the predicted behavior, we have strict inequalities. For 
example, lower valuation for men (VM < VF) as well as lower risk aversion for men (RM < RF) 
both imply MF < MM (see Appendix A), so the joint effect is certain: MF < MM. On the other 
                                                          
3 The value of winning can be viewed as an approximation to different non-monetary considerations, such as the 
non-monetary utility of winning (Sheremeta, 2010, 2013, 2015), the disutility of losing (Delgado et al., 2008), envy 
(Mago et al., 2015), status (Charness et al., 2013; Clingingsmith and Sheremeta, 2015; Chen et al., 2015), and 
recognition (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Samek and Sheremeta, 2014). Similarly, risk attitude can be viewed as an 
approximation to factors influencing individual behavior under uncertainty, such as risk aversion (Sheremeta, 2011), 
loss aversion (Shupp et al., 2013), and strategic risk (Masiliunas et al., 2014).  
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hand, lower valuation for men (VM < VF) implies MM < FF but lower risk aversion for men (RM 
< RF) implies MM > FF, so the joint effect is uncertain: MM <=> FF. 
 
3. Experiment 
We recruited a total of 192 subjects, 98 subjects (51 males, 47 females) from Shenzhen 
University and 94 subjects (39 males, 55 females) from University Town. Subjects were paired 
randomly and anonymously into four pairings: MM (42 subjects), MF (48 subjects), FM (53 
subjects), and FF (49 subjects). 
The experiment was conducted in the standard lecture hall. To reduce the time necessary 
for the experiment, we gave monitors envelopes according to rough estimates of the number of 
people in each lecture hall. Each envelope contained a bidding sheet with instructions (available 
in Appendix B) informing subjects that they had 10 CNY and could bid for additional 10 CNY in 
an all-pay auction. For a comparison, a student assistant makes 10-15 CNY per hour. 
On the bidding sheet, subjects could mark a bid ranging from 0 to 10 CNY in 0.5 CNY 
increments. The winner got the prize of 10 CNY. Bids of zero always gave subjects the 
endowment of 10 CNY. We gave subjects 10 examples of bids and corresponding payoffs, 
allowing two minutes for questions and answers. There was a place on the bidding sheet for 
students to write down their name and account information. The instructions told the students to 
put the bidding sheet back into the envelope. We transferred payments to their accounts after all 
sessions of the experiment were finished. 
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4. Results 
Figure 1 shows the average bid in the all-pay auction experiment by gender and 
opponent. If we were to assume that there are no gender differences in the value of winning (VM 
= VF) and risk attitude (RM = RF), then there should be no differences in behavior between men 
and women irrespective of the gender of the opponent. However, this is not what we find. 
Figure 1: Average Bid by Gender and Opponent  
 
 
Table 2: Comparison of Average Bids between Pairings 
Gender Pairs p-value Sign 
MM vs. FF 0.07 = 
FM vs. FF 0.04 < 
MF vs. MM 0.47 = 
FM vs. MM 0.81 = 
MF vs. FF 0.02 < 
MF vs. FM 0.64 = 
 
According to the theoretical predictions provided in Table 1, there are four possible 
scenarios which can be tested by pairwise comparison of bids. Table 2 provides comparison of 
average bids between different pairings. Consistent with our predictions, we find different 
7 
 
average bids depending on the gender of the opponent. Based on the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, 
women against women (FF) bid significantly more than women against men (FM) and 
significantly more than men against women (MF). Interestingly, women against men (FM) bid 
similarly to men against men (MM). These observations (i.e., MF < FF and FM = MM) are only 
consistent with the theoretical predictions derived under the assumption that women have a 
higher value of winning than men (VM < VF). However, these results are not conclusive about the 
impact of risk aversion on bidding behavior in all-pay auctions (RM < RF or RM > RF).
4 
Table 3: OLS Regressions 
Bid (1) (2) 
MM -1.13 -0.65 
 (0.72) (0.89) 
MF -1.79** -2.00** 
 (0.72) (1.01) 
FM -1.30* 0.58 
 (0.69) (0.76) 
MM×UT  -1.42 
  (1.10) 
FF×UT  -0.10 
  (0.96) 
MF×UT  0.33 
  (1.07) 
FM×UT  -3.67*** 
  (0.83) 
Constant 6.77*** 6.82*** 
 (0.49) (0.61) 
N 192 192 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 
the 10% level, ** significant at 5%, and *** 
at 1%. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
To check the robustness of our findings, we provide an additional regression analysis. 
Table 3 reports OLS regressions with robust standard errors, where the dependent variable is bid, 
                                                          
4 Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006) also find that risk aversion is not a plausible explanation for behavior in all-pay 
auctions.  
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and the independent variables are pairing dummies MM, MF and FM. The omitted pairing 
dummy is FF, which serves as a references point. Regression (1) confirms our earlier finding that 
men against women bid lower (negative estimate of MF) than women against women (the 
omitted variable FF). This is also true when we control for school (University Town vs. 
Shenzhen University) in regression (2). The interaction of the pairing dummy FM and school 
dummy UT is significantly negative, suggesting that women at University Town have lower 
value of winning than women at Shenzhen University. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
Our experiment shows that women bid higher in all-pay auctions than men, but only 
when bidding against other women. These findings, interpreted through a theoretical model, 
suggest that women have a higher value of winning than men.  
The advantage of our design is that instead of a winner-pay auction, we use an all-pay 
auction.5 Theoretically, overbidding in the winner-pay auction is consistent with higher risk 
aversion (Harrison, 1989). So, the fact that women bid more than men in winner-pay auctions is 
fully consistent with women being more risk averse (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). In contrast, 
overbidding in the all-pay auction is only consistent with lower (not higher) risk aversion 
(Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006). Therefore, the fact that we find that women bid more than 
men in the all-pay auction, implies that either (1) women are less risk averse, or (2) women have 
a higher value of winning. Our experimental evidence, interpreted through a theoretical model, 
suggest that it is the latter. 
                                                          
5 Employing an all-pay auction also has some advantages over real-effort tournaments. Most studies examining 
performance of subjects in real-effort tasks find that women decrease their performance under competition (Gneezy 
et al., 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Gunther at al., 2010). However, in these studies the subject’s ability is 
unobservable, which makes a clean comparison of effort impossible. The advantage of using an all-pay auction is 
that we can directly control the “ability” of subjects, by making all players in the auction symmetric. 
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While the implications of our findings for the literature on gender differences in 
competitiveness are more provocative than conclusive (until replicated by others and in other 
countries), a gender difference in the value of winning would seem important in explaining why 
women only enter tournaments in which they either have higher odds of winning, e.g., as 
incumbents in political contests (Fulton et al., 2006), or they are traditionally stronger, e.g., in 
verbal reasoning (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011), or when women can through higher effort or 
“grit” (Duckworth and Seligman, 2006) prepare more to increase their odds of success, e.g., in 
educational settings (Angrist et al., 2009). 
Future research should further try to reconcile gender differences in tournament entry and 
bidding behavior in auctions. We make a small step in this direction by pointing out that risk 
aversion is not a good candidate, since it would imply women bidding less in all-pay auctions 
(which is opposite to what we find). Instead, we suggest that a possible reason why women 
overbid in all-pay auctions is that they have a higher non-monetary value of winning the 
auction.6  
It is important to emphasize, however, that women having a higher value of winning 
cannot explain both aversion to entering tournaments and higher bidding in auctions. Instead, we 
suggest that perhaps when entering a tournament, individuals are myopic as to the potential value 
of winning such a tournament. It is also possible that the value of winning may simply not be 
reflected in tournament entry decisions. Irrespective of the exact interpretation, more research 
should be done reconciling gender differences in the auction literature and the tournament entry 
literature. 
  
                                                          
6 The value of winning can be viewed as an approximation to different non-monetary considerations, such as the 
non-monetary utility of winning, the disutility of losing, spite, envy, etc. Although we cannot distinguish between 
these different considerations in this study, we see this as a promising avenue for future research. 
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Appendix A (For Online Publication Only) – Theoretical Proofs 
When modeling an all-pay auction with complete information, we assume that player 1 
has a higher valuation V1 for winning the auction and player 2 has a lower valuation V2, i.e., V2 < 
V1. Both players simultaneously and independently submit their corresponding bids b1 and b2. 
The player who submits the highest bid wins the auction and receives the prize. However, both 
players have to pay their bids, win or lose. 
The mixed strategy equilibrium for the asymmetric all-pay auction with complete 
information and two risk neutral players is characterized by the following two equations: 
{
(𝑉2 − 𝑏)𝐺1(𝑏) + (−𝑏)(1 − 𝐺1(𝑏)) = 0            
(𝑉1 − 𝑏)𝐺2(𝑏) + (−𝑏)(1 − 𝐺2(𝑏)) = 𝑉1 − 𝑉2
      (1) 
Here, 𝐺1(𝑏) is the probability that player 1 bids lower than 𝑏 and 𝐺2(𝑏) is the probability 
that player 2 bids lower than 𝑏. 
An intuitive derivation follows. In any equilibrium, the higher valuation player 1 can 
always bid the lower valuation 𝑉2 and win, getting 𝑉1 − 𝑉2 with certainty. The lower valuation 
player 2 can always bid zero and get at least zero. Neither can get more than what they can 
guarantee because of competition. The same argument goes through in the risk-averse case 
(Fibich et al., 2006; Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006), with the only difference that player 1 gets 
the utility of 𝑈1(𝑉1 − 𝑉2) and player 2 gets the utility of 𝑈2(0) in equilibrium. Here we assume 
that the utility functions of players are increasing and weakly concave, that is, 𝑡𝑈𝑖(𝑐1) + (1 −
𝑡)𝑈𝑖(𝑐2) ≤ 𝑈𝑖(𝑡𝑐1 + (1 − 𝑡)𝑐2) for 𝑖 = 1, 2. 
{
𝑈2(𝑉2 − 𝑏)𝐺1(𝑏) + 𝑈2(−𝑏)(1 − 𝐺1(𝑏)) = 𝑈2(0)            
𝑈1(𝑉1 − 𝑏)𝐺2(𝑏) + 𝑈1(−𝑏)(1 − 𝐺2(𝑏)) = 𝑈1(𝑉1 − 𝑉2)
    (2) 
Equations described by (2) define a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which players 
must make each other indifferent between what they can get for sure (the right hand side of the 
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equation) and what they can get in any bid (the left hand side). From (2), we can solve for the 
equilibrium cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) or the “bidding functions”: 
{
𝐺1(𝑏) =
𝑈2(0)−𝑈2(−𝑏)
𝑈2(𝑉2−𝑏)−𝑈2(−𝑏)
𝐺2(𝑏) =
𝑈1(𝑉1−𝑉2)−𝑈1(−𝑏)
𝑈1(𝑉1−𝑏)−𝑈1(−𝑏)
        (3) 
Note that if players are risk neutral and have the same value of winning, i.e., 𝑈(𝑥) = 𝑥 
and 𝑉1 = 𝑉2 = 𝑉, then in equilibrium both players should randomly choose their bids between 0 
and 𝑉. That is: 
{
𝐺1(𝑏) =
𝑏
𝑉
𝐺2(𝑏) =
𝑏
𝑉
          (4) 
Before we derive the implications for the all-pay auctions in our experiment, we point out 
some general properties of the comparative statics of bidding functions (3). We will use these 
“rules” to give intuitions about how this auction theory applies to our female-female (FF), 
female-male (FM), male-female (MF) and male-male (MM) treatments. For convenience, we use 
“bid” to refer to “mean bids”. 
Rule 1: Player 1’s bid increases (on average) in player 2’s valuation.  
To see this, note that 𝐺1(𝑏) is decreasing in 𝑉2. 
Rule 2: Player 2’s bid decreases in player 1’s valuation and increases in his own. 
To see this, note that  𝐺2(𝑏) is increasing in 𝑉1 and decreasing in 𝑉2. 
Rule 3: If the opponent’s risk aversion increases, the bidder must decrease his bid. 
First, observe that only the opponent’s risk aversion affects the bidder’s bid. If the 
opponent becomes more risk-averse, the bidder will bid lower. Consider what happens when 
player 2 becomes more risk-averse from 𝑈2 to 𝑈2
′ . By the definition of risk aversion, the value of 
any gamble for 𝑈2
′  is less than that for 𝑈2. Then, player 2 will strictly prefer bidding zero, should 
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player 1 maintain his strategy of bidding according to 𝐺1(𝑏). But, if player 2 only bids zero, 
player 1 will want to bid lower. Equilibrium will be restored if player 1 plays 𝐺1
′(𝑏) > 𝐺1(𝑏) 
such that 𝑈2
′ (𝑉2 − 𝑏)𝐺1
′(𝑏) + 𝑈2
′ (−𝑏)(1 − 𝐺1
′(𝑏)) = 𝑈2
′ (0). In other words, when the bidder 𝑖’s 
risk aversion increases, the opponent’s bidding function, 𝐺𝑗(𝑏), must increase to compensate for 
the greater risk aversion of bidder 𝑖 and in order to maintain the indifference between all possible 
bids of bidder 𝑖 and what bidder 𝑖 can get for sure. 
Based on the rules that we have described, we develop comparative statics predictions for 
our experiment. For convenience, FF (female-female), FM (female-male), MF (male-female) and 
MM (male-male) refer to the average bids by females against females, females against males, 
males against females and males against males, respectively. We begin by assuming that females 
have a higher valuation for the prize than males 𝑉M < 𝑉F, holding the same risk aversion across 
gender. Given this assumption, we derive the following lemmas: 
Lemma 1: MM < FF.  
Proof: 𝐺FF(𝑏) =
𝑈(0)−𝑈(−𝑏)
𝑈(𝑉F−𝑏)−𝑈(−𝑏)
=
𝑈(0)−𝑈(−𝑏)
𝑈(𝑉F−𝑏)−𝑈(𝑉M−𝑏)+𝑈(𝑉M−𝑏)−𝑈(−𝑏)
< 
<
𝑈(0)−𝑈(−𝑏)
𝑈(𝑉M−𝑏)−𝑈(−𝑏)
= 𝐺MM(𝑏).  
Intuitively, by Rule 1, the higher valuation player (F) bids higher against the higher 
valuation opponent than against the lower valuation opponent (M). 
Lemma 2: FM < FF. 
Proof: 𝐺FF(𝑏) =
𝑈(0)−𝑈(−𝑏)
𝑈(𝑉F−𝑏)−𝑈(−𝑏)
=
𝑈(0)−𝑈(−𝑏)
𝑈(𝑉F−𝑏)−𝑈(𝑉M−𝑏)+𝑈(𝑉M−𝑏)−𝑈(−𝑏)
< 
<
𝑈(0)−𝑈(−𝑏)
𝑈(𝑉M−𝑏)−𝑈(−𝑏)
= 𝐺FM(𝑏).  
By Rule 1, the higher valuation player bids lower against the lower valuation opponent 
than against the higher valuation opponent. 
15 
 
Lemma 3: MF < MM. 
Proof: 𝐺MM(𝑏) =
𝑈(0)−𝑈(−𝑏)
𝑈(𝑉M−𝑏)−𝑈(−𝑏)
<
𝑈(0)+𝑈(𝑉F−𝑉M)−𝑈(0)−𝑈(−𝑏)
𝑈(𝑉M−𝑏)+𝑈(𝑉F−𝑉M)−𝑈(0)−𝑈(−𝑏)
≤ 
≤
𝑈(0)+𝑈(𝑉F−𝑉M)−𝑈(0)−𝑈(−𝑏)
𝑈(𝑉M−𝑏)+𝑈(𝑉F−𝑏)−𝑈(𝑉M−𝑏)−𝑈(−𝑏)
=
𝑈(𝑉F−𝑉M)−𝑈(−𝑏)
𝑈(𝑉F−𝑏)−𝑈(−𝑏)
= 𝐺MF(𝑏). 
Intuitively, by Rule 2, the lower valuation player bids lower against the higher valuation 
opponent than against the lower valuation opponent. Note that the weak inequality is due to 
𝑈(𝑉F − 𝑏) − 𝑈(𝑉M − 𝑏) ≤  𝑈(𝑉F − 𝑉M) − 𝑈(0)  which results from the fact that the utility 
function 𝑈(∙) is weakly concave. To see this note that for 𝑏 ∈ [0, 𝑉M] and 𝑉F > 𝑉M , we have 
𝑈(0) ≤ min{𝑈(𝑉F − 𝑉M), 𝑈(𝑉M − 𝑏)} ≤ max{𝑈(𝑉F − 𝑉M), 𝑈(𝑉M − 𝑏)} ≤ 𝑈(𝑉F − 𝑏) . By 
concavity we have (1 − 𝑡)𝑈(0) + 𝑡𝑈(𝑉F − 𝑏) ≤ 𝑈(𝑉F − 𝑉M)  for  𝑡 =
𝑉F−𝑉M
𝑉F−𝑏
∈ (0,1] , and 
(1 − 𝑠)𝑈(0) + 𝑠𝑈(𝑉F − 𝑏) ≤ 𝑈(𝑉M − 𝑏)  for 𝑠 =
𝑉M−𝑏
𝑉F−𝑏
∈ [0,1) . Therefore, 𝑈(𝑉F − 𝑉M) +
𝑈(𝑉M − 𝑏) ≥ (1 − 𝑡)𝑈(0) + 𝑡𝑈(𝑉F − 𝑏) + (1 − 𝑠)𝑈(0) + 𝑠𝑈(𝑉F − 𝑏) = (2 − 𝑠 − 𝑡)𝑈(0) +
(𝑠 + 𝑡)𝑈(𝑉F − 𝑏), and since 𝑠 + 𝑡 =
𝑉M−𝑏
𝑉F−𝑏
+
𝑉F−𝑉M
𝑉F−𝑏
= 1, we have 𝑈(𝑉F − 𝑉M) + 𝑈(𝑉M − 𝑏) ≥
𝑈(0) + 𝑈(𝑉F − 𝑏), i.e.,  𝑈(𝑉F − 𝑏) − 𝑈(𝑉M − 𝑏) ≤  𝑈(𝑉F − 𝑉M) − 𝑈(0). 
Lemma 4: FM = MM. 
Proof: 𝐺MM(𝑏) =
𝑈(0)−𝑈(−𝑏)
𝑈(𝑉M−𝑏)−𝑈(−𝑏)
= 𝐺FM(𝑏).  
To see this, note that F was assumed to be the highest valuation player in FM, and M is of 
course the highest valuation player in MM. According to the bidding function 𝐺1(𝑏) derived 
previously, the highest valuation player 1’s bid is not a function of his own valuation 𝑉1. 
Lemma 5: MF < FM. 
Proof: 𝐺FM(𝑏) =
𝑈(0)−𝑈(−𝑏)
𝑈(𝑉M−𝑏)−𝑈(−𝑏)
<
𝑈(0)+𝑈(𝑉F−𝑉M)−𝑈(0)−𝑈(−𝑏)
𝑈(𝑉M−𝑏)+𝑈(𝑉F−𝑉M)−𝑈(0)−𝑈(−𝑏)
≤ 
≤
𝑈(0)+𝑈(𝑉F−𝑉M)−𝑈(0)−𝑈(−𝑏)
𝑈(𝑉M−𝑏)+𝑈(𝑉F−𝑏)−𝑈(𝑉M−𝑏)−𝑈(−𝑏)
=
𝑈(𝑉F−𝑉M)−𝑈(−𝑏)
𝑈(𝑉F−𝑏)−𝑈(−𝑏)
= 𝐺MF(𝑏). 
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Lemma 6: MF < FF. 
Proof: Follows from FF > FM and FM > MF. 
Intuitively, by Rule 2, the lower valuation player bids lower against the higher valuation 
opponent than the higher valuation player against the higher valuation opponent. 
Now assume that females are more risk-averse than males 𝑅M < 𝑅F, holding the same 
valuation. Given this assumption, we derive the following lemmas: 
Lemma 7: MM > FF. 
Proof: By Rule 3, F bids lower against the more risk-averse opponent F. 
Lemma 8: FM > FF. 
Proof: By Rule 3, F bids lower against the more risk-averse opponent F. 
Lemma 9: MF < MM. 
Proof: By Rule 3, M bids lower against the more risk-averse opponent F. 
Lemma 10: FM = MM. 
Proof: Fixing the opponent fixes the effect of risk aversion on bidder’s bid. Thus, FM = 
MM. 
Lemma 11: MF = FF. 
Proof: Again, by Rule 3, fixing the opponent fixes the effect of risk aversion.  
Lemma 12: MF < FM. 
Proof: By Lemmas 8 and 11, MF = FF < FM. 
We can create a table of comparative statics predictions, based on the assumptions that 
we made (i.e., 𝑉M < 𝑉F  and 𝑅M < 𝑅F ) and the corresponding lemmas that we derived (i.e., 
Lemma 1 – Lemma 12). When valuation and risk aversion have the same effect on the predicted 
behavior, we get strict inequalities. For example, lower valuation for men (𝑉M < 𝑉F) as well as 
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lower risk aversion for men (𝑅M < 𝑅F) both imply MF < MM (see Lemma 3 and Lemma 9), so 
the joint effect is certain: MF < MM. On the other hand, lower valuation for men (𝑉M < 𝑉F) 
implies MM < FF but lower risk aversion for men (𝑅M < 𝑅F) implies MM > FF, so the joint 
effect is uncertain: MM <=> FF. These comparative statics predictions, as well as all other 
comparative statistics prediction that can be derived in a similar fashion, are shown in Table 1. 
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